The good news is that people can move from independence to interdependence. The first step is making a realistic assessment of the management style practiced in the organization today. At work, do you frequently hear, “I don’t care what you think. I’m the boss—so just do it!”? This type of statement, and the thinking and culture behind it, is death to a business and to the possibility of partnerships.
Once you’ve completed all exercises, tally up the totals in the “Yes” and “No” columns. If you answered with a “no” to more than three questions, you may want to think about the independent paradigm of your organization. When leaders value interdependence, they create an environment that encourages involvement. From the boardroom to the shop floor, the more people are involved, the more interaction occurs. With that interaction comes a sense that “we are all in this together,” and information starts to flow freely. The free exchange of information is fundamental to the success of organizations and a cornerstone of creativity. An organization that creates this kind of environment—one that build trust and eliminates fear—moves beyond competition into the zone of creativity and synergy.
Parties will achieve resolution through their joint efforts to discover the best solution. Communication skills are critical. We helped people become better listeners by focusing on a few steps:
Credit rating agencies try to provide investors with a reliable estimate of credit risk. While S&P’s assessment of credit quality is based on the probability of default, Moody’s uses the product of the probability of default and loss given default, or in other words loss severity, to arrive at a rating. The default probability tracks relative risk over time. When loss severity is estimated, rating agencies consider issue characteristics, the degree of seniority and sector differences. Furthermore, it has to be taken into account that recovery rates vary over time and across jurisdictions. Ultimately, the rating is expected to mirror the future expected loss over time, based on historical experience.
Clearly corporate borrowers have more detailed information about their businesses and credit profiles than do lenders, in particular when they access capital markets to finance their business. Commercial banks usually have a close contact with their clients, thus lending decisions are based on a profound understanding of the borrowers. Because relations between companies and banks tend to be long term, commercial banks are able to monitor the credit quality of a borrower constantly and use covenants to prevent potentially credit-detrimental activities. If necessary, banks can agree to restructure loans in order to recover funds before allowing the company to default.
Agency ratings are a standard metric of credit quality. Yet the blowup of large corporations like WorldCom, Enron and Parmalat has raised questions about the timeliness of rating changes. Nevertheless, agency ratings are a convenient, widely used indicator for a borrower’s ability to service its liabilities. In their mission statement Moody’s, one of the world’s leading rating agencies, argue that “Credit ratings and research help investors analyze the credit risks associated with fixed-income securities. Ratings also create efficiencies in fixed-income markets and similar obligations, such as insurance and derivatives, by providing reliable, credible, and independent assessments of credit risk. For issuers, Moody’s services increase market liquidity and may reduce transaction costs.” This statement stresses that rating agencies see themselves as the providers of independent assessments of the credit quality of an issuer. Thus their objective is to promote the efficiency of credit markets by reducing the information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders.
As of December 2003, the iBoxx Euro Liquid Corporates Index offered a spread over duration-matched government bonds of 60 bp. Assuming stable spreads, an investor, who measures his performance against government bonds, would have expected to earn an excess return of 60 bp. Yet, this calculation ignores the risk of credit events. If one name blows up and the price of the bond falls to 70 until it is excluded from the index, the portfolio suffers a loss depending on the weight of the issuer. If the index weight of the issuer exceeds 2 percent, the loss on this one name wipes out the complete expected excess return. This example illustrates that insufficiently diversified portfolios are highly vulnerable to idiosyncratic risks. Even for an actively managed portfolio, the concentration on only 40 issuers would require an extremely high success rate of the analyst and portfolio manager in anticipating possible blowups. Clearly, it might be objected that most blowups have significantly smaller weightings and that focusing on “safe” names in actively managed portfolios reduces risk. Yet, especially for real money investors who are benchmarked against government bonds, the risk associated with investing in narrow corporate bond baskets is asymmetric, because they are not able to benefit from an underweight position on overall corporate bonds and particularly on single names.